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INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth previously in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-4). 
The Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's Brief, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Sery's conditional plea of no contest is an 
appropriate procedure following denial of a suppression motion to 
reserve the right to appeal the suppression issue. 
The officers lacked a reasonable suspicion based on 
specific objective facts to justify the detention of Mr. Sery and 
his suitcase. 
ARGUMENT 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
POINT I. MR. SERY'S CONDITIONAL PLEA OF NO CONTEST 
IS AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE FOLLOWING DENIAL OF A 
SUPPRESSION MOTION TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
THE SUPPRESSION ISSUE. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 
(Utah 1986), held that acceptance of a conditional plea was not 
improper. The facts in Kay involved a plea bargain in which the 
defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of capital homicide in 
exchange for a promise that he would be sentenced to life 
imprisonment rather than death, in concluding that the acceptance 
of a conditional plea was proper,the court relied on Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 11, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-11(f)(1982) 
finding that nothing in the statute prohibited a court from 
accepting a conditional plea. State v. Kay, supra, at 1301. This 
statute is not limited to capital cases but is applicable to all 
criminal cases and should be applied accordingly. Furthermore there 
is no language in Kay which, as the State urges, limits the use of 
conditional pleas to capital cases. 
The State contends that although Kay does not prohibit 
the type of conditional plea entered by Mr. Sery, such a plea is not 
permitted by Utah case law. The State relies on State v. Yeck, 566 
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977), and State v. Beck. 594 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978), 
for the proposition that Utah case law does not allow a defendant to 
plead guilty and then appeal a pre-trial ruling. Both of these 
cases are distinguishable from the present case and therefore are 
not controlling. 
State v. Beck, supra, involved a defendant who, as part 
of a plea bargain, pleaded guilty to second degree murder after 
having been tried for first degree murder before a hung jury. Beck 
appealed from his guilty plea requesting that his sentence be 
vacated and that he have a trial on the second degree murder charge. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that defendant voluntarily and 
intelligently pleaded guilty to second degree murder and by so doing 
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waived any claim of error. In Beck, no claim of error was made 
prior to entering the guilty plea, and no right to appeal preserved 
and therefore the defendant waived any subsequent claim of error. 
The issue in the present case differs from Beck in that 
Mr. Sery's appeal does not involve the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
nor does it involve the appeal of a right which Appellant waived by 
entering a guilty plea. On the contrary, Mr. Sery claimed error 
when his motion to suppress was denied, expressly preserved the 
right to appeal prior to entering a plea, and plead rio contest to 
the charge. 
The State also contends that State v. Yeck, supra, 
precludes Mr. Sery from pleading guilty and then claiming error on 
appeal. As did Beck, Yeck involved an attempt by the defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea. The defendant, as part of a plea bargain 
agreement, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge of theft by 
deception but later moved to withdraw his plea. The motion to 
withdraw was denied and defendant appealed the denial on the grounds 
that he was denied his constitutional right to trial by a jury. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that where a guilty plea is entered into as 
part of a plea bargain, it is entirely within the discretion of the 
trial court to permit or deny the defendant to withdraw his plea. 
By entering his guilty plea defendant had knowingly waived his right 
to a jury trial; therefore, there was no appealable issue. 
A no contest plea is distinct from a plea of guilty in 
that an accused does not acknowledge that he is guilty of the 
offense charged. See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-2 (1953 as amended). 
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While a plea of no contest is the legal equivalent of a guilty plea 
in that it permits a court to sentence the accused for the offense 
(See Lott v, United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961); North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), there are distinctions between the use 
of a no contest plea and a guilty plea. A no contest plea is not 
admissible in a subsequent civil action whereas a guilty plea is 
generally admissible. See Lacey v. People, 442 P.2d 402, 405 (Colo. 
1968); State v. Holmes, 563 P.2d 480, 481 (Kan. 1977). In addition, 
where a defendant maintains his innocence throughout a proceeding, 
but enters into a plea bargain because of the risks of going to 
trial coupled with the advantages of the plea bargain, use of a no 
contest plea rather than entry of a guilty plea, is the appropriate, 
ethical approach. See North Carolina v. Alford, supra. 
When the State and the defendant enter an express 
agreement to preserve an objection to evidence found admissible by 
the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, the appellate court 
is not faced with the same sort of finality issues which arose in 
Yeck and Beck. The procedure used in this case is a clearly 
delineated, economical approach to preservation of issues which 
saves valuable time without jeopardizing a defendant's rights or the 
state's ability to pursue its case in a busy trial court calendar. 
Upon entry of a no contest plea, the parties agreed to preserve an 
appeal issue rather than go through a trial which would require a 
needless expenditure of resources. Even a bench trial on stipulated 
facts would have required significant time to work out the 
stipulation and present it to the court. Where the state and 
defendant are in accord that an issue is appealable and should be 
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appealed, a conditional plea of no contest, expressly preserving 
that issue, should be available to expedite the process and clarify 
that no issue other than the one expressly reserved by the defendant 
is appealable. 
Several state and federal courts have found this 
procedure appropriate in criminal cases. See Zehrung v. State, 569 
P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 
1974); U.S. v. Caraway, 474 F.2d 25, (5th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. 
Rosenberg, 458 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1972), U.S. v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 
176 (5th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2nd Cir. 1965); 
cert denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Jaben v. U.S., 333 F.2d 535 (8th 
Cir. 1964), affirmed 381 U.S. 214 (1965) rehearing denied 382 U.S. 
873 (1965). This method of appeal was also employed in United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), where the defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence of the contents of his suitcase was denied. 
The defendant plead guilty (rather than no contest) to the 
possession charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress. Id. at 700. 
The State implies that in order for this Court to 
validate the type of conditional plea entered by Mr. Sery it must 
overrule the rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Beck, 
supra, and State v. Yeck, supra. This Court's acceptance of the 
plea procedure does not require such action by this Court because in 
those cases, the defendants did not enter & conditional plea of no 
contest or expressly preserve an issue. Furthermore, an approval by 
this Court would parallel the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State 
v. Kay, supra. 
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Based on case law from within the jurisdiction as well as 
numerous other state and federal jurisdictions permitting the use of 
a no contest plea which expressly preserves the right to appeal and 
which was accepted by the Court with the State's stipulation, Mr. 
Sery requests this Court accept the conditional plea procedure as an 
appropriate method of preserving an issue for appeal, and review on 
appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress. 
POINT II. MR. SERY WAS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED BY 
AGENTS LACKING IN THE REASONABLE SUSPICION 
NECESSARY TO SEIZE HIM AND HIS LUGGAGE. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982) codifies the 
constitutional requirements first announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). The statute reads: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
In its brief the State concedes "that the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion when they initially approached defendant." Brief of 
Respondent at 14. The State then maintains that "[a]fter the 
initial encounter with defendant the officers obtained additional 
facts which caused them to believe that defendant was committing a 
crime." Brief of Respondent at 14. 
The State further correctly concedes that "there is no 
question that defendant was seized at the moment the officers took 
his luggage and subjected it to a canine sniff." Brief of 
Respondent at 15. 
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After the initial encounter between the agents and Mr. 
Sery, the agents informed him that he was free to leave (T. 9). The 
state suggests that "further investigation gave Sergeant Pearson 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying narcotics." Brief 
of Respondent at 20. The State later indicates seven factual 
considerations or facts relied upon by the agents in this case to 
determine the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion. Brief of 
Respondent at 25-26. 
However, not only does the State stretch the facts in 
this case, but it also misconstrues and misapplies the case law to 
these facts. Moreover, six of the seven articulated factors were 
already known to the agents before or at the time of the first 
encounter—at which time the State candidly admits a lack of 
reasonable suspicion. Brief of Respondent at 14. 
The State lists the following seven factors: 
1. Defendant arrived from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a 
known entrance point for illegal narcotics in the 
United States. 
2. Defendant appeared nervous and watchful and waited at 
the deplaning area before proceeding to the luggage 
area; 
3. Defendant went to a telephone booth and picked up the 
phone several times without making a call; 
4. Defendant took an awkward route away from the phones 
to the concourse avoiding the agents; 
5. Defendant was traveling under an assumed name; 
6. Defendant claimed to have no identification of any 
kind; and, 
7. Defendant left a non-working telephone number with 
the airline. 
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Brief of Respondent at 24-25 (citations omitted). Additionally the 
State urges that the overall experience of the training officer 
assists in interpreting these factors in a manner which supports a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Sery was transporting narcotics. Each 
factor will now be examined individually and then collectively. 
1. Defendant arrived from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a 
known entrance point for illegal narcotics in the United States. 
The state correctly indicates that the articulable facts must be 
considered on the totality of the circumstances, indicating 
reasonable suspicion. Brief of Respondent at 25 (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, supra; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); and State 
v. Trujillo, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, P.2d (Utah App. 
1987)). Accordingly, the presence of this factor (as well as any 
other) is not dispositive of the issue of reasonable suspicion. For 
example, the State cites United States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 789 
(11th Cir. 1984), to demonstrate this factor as a legitimate one. 
In Puglisi, however, this factor was but one of the ten factors 
considered and the court indicated that ff[n]one of these facts, 
standing alone, was sufficient to give [the agent] the reasonable 
suspicion needed. . ." Id. Furthermore, the court also highlighted 
three factors of the ten, excluding this one, which especially 
supported the reasonable suspicion found therein. Id. in short, 
inasmuch as many people travel from Florida, this factor offers 
little toward an articulable suspicion of transporting narcotics. 
This factor was one of the six which was known to agents during the 
first encounter that the State concedes lacked the requisite 
reasonable suspicion. 
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2. Defendant appeared nervous and watchful and waited at 
the deplaning area before proceeding to the luggage area. 
Nervousness is often claimed by agents as an articulable factor and 
has been sanctioned by the courts as legitimate—it was one of the 
three emphasized considerations in Puglisi/ supra. However, this 
factor, more than any other, is subjective in nature and often self 
serving when articulated by agents. Accordingly, more is usually 
required than just claiming nervousness and watching and waiting at 
deplaning. In Puglisi, supra, the defendant "grew intensively 
nervous . . . to the point where he was having trouble breathing 
properly." Id. at 789. In United States v. Lucci, 758 F.2d 153 
(6th Cir. 1985), the defendants were "so nervous that they both had 
trouble getting their licenses out of their wallets." Id. at 154. 
No such claim demonstrative of nervousness was articulated in the 
case at bar. Also noteworthy in the case at bar is that being 
nervous, watchful, and waiting in the deplaning area is consistent 
with expecting to have been met upon arrival and does not 
necessarily indicate the transportation of drugs. This factor was 
also one of the six which was known to agents during the first 
encounter that the State concedes lacked the requisite reasonable 
suspicion. 
3. Defendant went to a telephone booth and picked up the 
phone several times without making a call. Regarding this factor 
the State is simply stretching the facts of the case. Sergeant 
Pearson, the teaching agent relied on in this case by the State, 
testified that it was hard for him to observe whether an actual 
phone call was made because Mr. Sery was within a partitioned area 
(T. 7). Mr. Sery testified that he picked up the phone, failed to 
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hear a dial tone, replaced it, picked it up again, inserted a 
quarter, and then made a call regarding his expected ride (T. 
67-68). Again, this action is consistent with innocence and adds 
very little to a reasonable suspicion of transporting drugs. This 
factor also was one of the six which was known to agents during the 
first encounter that the State concedes lacked the requisite 
reasonable suspicion. 
4. Defendant took an awkward route away from the phones 
to the concourse avoiding the agents. This factor, as with factor 
number 2, is inherently subjective and gratuitous. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that Mr. Sery's route from the phones was "awkward," it 
could be due to an innocent effort to avoid at least two and 
possibly as many as four or six individuals who had been observing 
and following him rather than criminal behavior. Once again, this 
factor was one of six which was known to agents during the first 
encounter that the state concedes lacked the requisite reasonable 
suspicion. 
5. Defendant was traveling under an assumed name. The 
facts do not indicate that Mr. Sery was traveling under an assumed 
name. Rather, Mr. Sery admitted readily that the name on his ticket 
was not his but that the airline had made a mistake in preparing the 
ticket (T. 9, 25). There was never an attempt to conceal his 
identity. This factor was one of the six out of the seven which was 
known to agents during the first encounter that the State concedes 
lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion. 
6. Defendant claimed to have no identification of any 
kind. Mr. Sery—like any United States citizen—is not required to 
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carry identification. It is questionable that an inference of 
suspicion can be derived from an act which is unnecessary and not 
required by law. This factor adds little to form a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of transporting drugs. This sixth factor, of 
the seven articulated, was also known to agents during the first 
encounter that the State concedes lacked the requisite reasonable 
suspicion. 
7. Defendant left a non-working telephone number with 
the airline. The State again misrepresents the facts. Mr. Sery did 
not leave a non-working telephone number with the airline; he left 
his number which was subsequently changed to a nonpublished number. 
Such an action is certainly lawful and in no way implies 
criminality. When police agents called the number they did not find 
the number to be false, as in the case relied upon by the State, 
United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1508 (11th Cir. 
1986), where the person answering the call denied any knowledge of 
anyone by the name the defendant had used there. All that occurred 
in this case is that the agents called the provided number and found 
it to have been changed to a nonpublished number (T. 11, 26). 
The agents had retrieved the number from Delta Airlines 
but obtained no other information as to when it had been given to 
the airlines or any other information from which to infer any 
criminality (T. 25-26). Yet, this seventh factor is the "additional 
investigation11 which the State claims occurred between the first 
encounter—which lacked reasonable suspicion (Brief of Respondent at 
14, 20)—and the second encounter which they claim established 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Sery was carrying 
narcotics. Brief of Respondent at 20. Sergeant Pearson's testimony 
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on direct examination affirmed the phone number as the only added 
information: 
Q. Prior to obtaining the dope dog, for lack of a 
better word, did you—are you aware of any other 
investigation that was conducted at that time? 
A. Other than the phone number, no, sir, I 
continued to make observations of the defendant. 
(T. 15). 1 
This seventh factor is erroneously claimed by the State 
as a reasonable articulable factor implying suspicion of 
transporting narcotics. Even if it were true, this factor would not 
be dispositive of the question. It is incomprehensible that the 
State's concession that no reasonable suspicion existed from the 
first six factors can suddenly be elevated to find reasonable 
suspicion on an erroneously articulated seventh factor. 
While recognizing that the experience of agents warrants 
some deference, this case requires special consideration. Agent 
Pearson was conducting training at the airport for twenty to 
twenty-five local officers (T. 5, 50). His usual success rate of 
ninety percent was reduced to a practical percentage of only fifty 
percent during the training (T. 41, 53). Such statistics strongly 
suggest that simply investigating was emphasized above substantive 
and constitutional requirements for the sake of instruction. 
1
 Sergeant Pearson enumerated one additional factor during 
cross-examination: "The fact that after he left, [Mr. Sery] refused 
to give us a consent to search and was allowed to go on his way 
. . .
ff
 (T. 38). Mr. Sery was not legally required to answer 
questions and could legally go on his way under these 
circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, supra. His refusal to listen or 
answer or comply with a request to search may not, therefore, be 
used to support the officer's reasonable suspicion. 
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Whatever the reason; Mr. Sery's constitutional protections are not 
permissibly diminished for expediency, nor for pedagogical 
objectives. As the United States Supreme Court summarized in Reid 
v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980), the factors articulated in 
this case "describe a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the 
Court to conclude that as little information as there was in this 
case could justify a seizure. 
The above seven factors individually and collectively 
fail to support a reasonable articulable suspicion. As such, agents 
who unlawfully stopped and detained Mr. Sery impermissibly intruded 
on his constitutional protections against unreasonable search and 
seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, Terry v. Ohio, supra, and Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 
(1982). Accordingly, the evidence which followed from the unlawful 
stop and detention of Mr. Sery is tainted and thereby excludable 
under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
The State seeks to skirt the requirements of the Utah 
Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982), as well as the demands of the 
constitutional protections mentioned above and expressed in Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, by claiming the reliance of good faith on the part of 
the agents. Such reliance is misplaced. The claim of good faith 
has never been extended to the area of Terry—stops to substantiate 
otherwise insufficient reasonable suspicion to justify detaining an 
individual. The State cites Rule 12(g) of the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure for support for the proposition. Brief of 
Respondent at 10-11. The State also claims that various federal 
decision uphold their premise. Brief of Respondent at 11 (citing 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 
(1980); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); and United 
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). Such a contention 
is without merit. 
United States v. Leon, supra, is readily distinguishable 
as it is a case where the officers were held to have reasonably 
relied on a technically deficient warrant. Both Illinois v. Krull, 
supra, and United States v. Williams, supra, are also 
distinguishable as they deal with probable cause for warrantless 
arrests where the officers relied upon respective statutes 
authorizing the action where those statutes were later found 
unconstitutional. In the case at bar the agents were not acting on 
probable cause with or without a warrant1 they were implementing an 
investigatory stop as controlled by Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982) 
and Terry v. Ohio, supra. The agents could not reasonably rely on 
Rule 12(g), a procedural rule; their reliance must be based upon 
substantive criteria, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982) and Terry 
v. Ohio, which authorizes their behavior. Any deviation from the 
behavior authorized therein is not explicable as good faith 
deviation. 
Moreover, the States assertion that any challenges to 
Rule 12(g) would be improper before this Court is also in error. 
Brief of Respondent at 11 n.3. Any rule can and must meet 
constitutional challenges levied against it at any juncture, and any 
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rule is only constitutional so long as it properly confined within 
the parameters and bounds already laid out by the United States and 
Utah Supreme Courts. Therefore, an assertion that Rule 12(g) is 
beyond reproach, as an interpretation which exceeds the bounds of 
prior decisions, as suggested by the State, is not only subject to 
constitutional scrutiny but may be presumed unconstitutional. Rule 
12(g) must be interpreted within the bounds of existing law to 
remain constitutional. Good faith may not rehabilitate an otherwise 
unlawful investigatory stop. 
As agents lacked any reasonable articulable suspicion to 
justify the investigatory stop and seizure of Mr. Sery, they also 
could not have had probable cause to make an arrest. The evidence 
which flowed from the unlawful seizure must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Sery 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
charges or provide for a new trial. 
DATED this f day of November, 1987. 
72A^ 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT ' 
Attorney for Appellant 
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